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THE EVOLVING DOCTRINE OF
UNCONSCIONABILITY IN MODERN
ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING
Thomas Gamarello

This paper examines the evolution of the unconscionability
doctrine as it applies to end-user license agreements, explores the
intrinsic unconscionability of these agreements and discusses what
measures can be taken to ensure the fairness, validity, and enforceability
of these types of electronic contracts in the future.

I. INTRODUCTION
It’s 9PM on a Wednesday. You just finished the dishes and the
laundry. The kids are asleep. There’s nothing on television so you
decide to log onto the Internet and surf for a while before retiring. After
twenty minutes of monkey videos and cat memes, you think you’ll
finally try out this thing co-workers have been nagging you about—
Facebook. You don’t have an account, a profile, a page, or whatever-itis-that-they-call-it. It seems as though you’re the only one in the office
that doesn’t have one. Years ago you were lured into the clutches of
MySpace only to come to the realization that there are plenty of people
you’ve met along the way you had no intention of keeping in touch with.
Robert Frost once wrote “good fences make good neighbors.”1 You
realize that time and distance are great fences and the advent of social
networking threatens to tear them down, or, worse, render them obsolete.
You think to yourself “social networking must be making poor Robert
roll over in his snow-covered, less-traveled-by grave.” The Internet is
abuzz with snooping and PDAs (note: not the smartphone type) and
oversharing and T.M.I.-ing. Basically, the whole world has become your
1

Robert Frost, “Mending Wall,” North of Boston (1914)
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little sister—a nosy busybody. You said you’d never succumb again:
once bitten, twice shy. However, you cave to the peer pressure like that
time with the Marlboro Reds in the high school parking lot, only this
time with much less coughing. You pull up the webpage and follow the
on-screen instructions to create your account, profile, page or whateverit-is-that-they-call-it, like the good 21st century cyber-lemming you are.
Somewhere during this E-journey of Odysseus you come upon a page
that asks you to click “I Accept” which you realize will certify that
you’ve not only read the War and Peace-like tome of terms of service
(the Tomes of Service?) but that you actually agree to them, as if you
had any choice. The nerve of that Zuckerberg. And to think you
actually liked that movie. Frustrated, you “x” out of the window and go
back to the monkey videos and cat memes—after all, the only thing they
ask you to do is watch them…
The above very well could be the typical narrative of the typical
Internet-user on a typical Wednesday evening. Nearly 2.5 billion of the
7 billion people in the world have access to the Internet, according to the
World Bank.2 Of that number, about 1 billion people are already using
Facebook.3 If Zuckerberg had his druthers, the remaining 4.5 billion
people on the planet will have access to the Internet as well, many of
whom will become users of Facebook.4 “Connectivity is a human right,”
Zuckerberg says.5 That is probably overstating it, Mark. Access to
potable water and shelter from the elements are rights cognizable
throughout most, if not all, of the world as basic human rights—access to
the Internet, social networking sites like Facebook, or monkey videos
and cat memes, are not.
However, envision for a moment a future where perhaps over
90% of the world does have access to the Internet, as compared to the
mere 35% today. Does your opinion about access to free social
networking sites like Facebook change? Suppose that the radiation that
cell phones emit into our brains is proven to be carcinogenic and that the
new wave of communication is a luxury only the One Percent-ers can
2
John Griffin, Mark Zuckerberg’s big idea: The ‘next 5 billion people, CNNMONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/20/technology/social/facebook-zuckerberg-5-billion/
(August
21,
2013).
3
4
5

Id.
Id.
Id.
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afford; yet, at the click of a button, you could communicate with your
family and friends throughout the entire world (or galaxy). How about
now? Suddenly what was once a privilege starts to resemble a right, or
at least a colorable right.
Now take into consideration that even today the social
networking and e-communication sites of the universe control your
access. You will not be allowed to use their service without expressly
agreeing to their terms. There is no opportunity to negotiate—take it or
leave it. There is also no real choice: should you choose not to accept
their terms you sacrifice your ability to use their service, and, in so
doing, perhaps sacrifice your only means of communicating with loved
ones. There is no choice—only a Hobson’s choice. Furthermore, by
accepting their terms of service, you are giving the site blanket
permission to use or sell your personally identifiable information as they
see fit and without any compensation to you. In layman’s terms, all of
this amounts to the very essence of unconscionability—the tyranny of
stronger parties, who can change the rules of the game at any time, or
even take their ball and go home, while forcing weaker parties to accept
the changes without any real alternative.
Electronic contracts like these are made millions of times per
day, even though contract law casebooks suggest that they are probably
unenforceable due to their unconscionability. In the increasingly
important modern world of e-contracting, it is vital that we address these
severe inequalities in bargaining power in order to ensure the
enforceability of our contracts.6 We must ensure that both parties have
an equal power to negotiate—not just one party—and that neither party
is forced into a Hobson’s choice where there is no choice at all. This
paper explores the unconscionability doctrine, how we arrived here, and
what can be done in the future.

Encompassed in the Latin phrase pacta sunt servanda meaning “agreements must be kept,” the
enforceability of contracts is one of the oldest and most revered aspects of society. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contract, n. 4 (last visited October 18, 2013)(quoting Hans Wehberg,
Pacta Sunt Servanda, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Oct. 1959), p.775.
See also Eli Lilly Do Brasil, Ltda. v. Federal Express Corporation, 503 F.3d 78, 82 (2nd Cir. 2007); See
also Restatement (Second) of Contracts 8 Intro. Note (1981) (“In general, parties may contract as they
wish, and courts will enforce their agreements without passing on their substance…The principle of
freedom of contract is itself rooted in the notion that it is in the public interest to recognize that
individuals have broad powers to order their own affair by making legally enforceable promises.”)
6
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE
While the unconscionability doctrine was not formally adopted
into the American legal lexicon until the 20th century, its footprint has
existed for centuries. 7 The idea that courts should refuse to enforce
grossly unfair bargains, or at least be generally suspicious of them,8 is
nothing new, either in America law9 or beyond. 10 11 Changes in the
economic and social climate of the early 20th century created a glaring
need for how courts can and should adjudicate extremely unfair
bargains.12 The large businesses which emerged during this time period
were looking for fast, easy and standardized ways to contract, oftentimes
adopting form contracts littered with numerous boilerplate provisions
which were extremely favorable to the more powerful party. 13 Such
provisions were usually take it or leave it provisions, which the weaker
party would almost certainly not agree to in an environment of equal
bargaining power, yet were coerced into accepting because of a lack of
choice.14 While the unconscionability doctrine was promulgated
primarily as a protection of the unsophisticated “David” consumers
7
John P. Dawson, Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 345,
12 Tul. L. Rev. 42 (1937).
8
C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 180 (Iowa 1975) (quoting
comment d to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208: “Weakness in the bargaining process'
incorporates the following observation, ‘(G)ross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms
unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved
elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no
real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair terms.’”).
9
“If a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court of law will give
to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its letter, but only such as he is equitably
entitled to….” Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (quoting
Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 443, 445, 20 L. Ed. 438 (1870)).
10
Under Roman law, which had a great impact on the development of civil law in the civil law
countries such as France and Germany, the doctrine of “laesio enormis” allowed a party to rescind a
grossly unfair land sale contract. Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal & Harry G. Prince, Problems in
Contract Law: Cases and Materials 584 (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed. 2007).
11
Seeds of the modern unconscionability doctrine can also be seen in the legal concept from the
British common law known as intrinsic fraud, a fraud which can be presumed merely from the grossly
unfair contract parameters. “…[Fraud] may be apparent from the intrinsic nature of the subject of the
bargain itself; such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make.” Earl of Chesterfield
v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Eng. 1751) (L.J. Hardwicke).
12
13
14

Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra n. 10 at 585.
Id.
Id.; see also C & J Fertilizer, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 169.
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against the “Goliath” of predatory merchants,15 it also provides a degree
of protection to small businesses against the deep pockets and leverage
of big businesses.16
To address contract problems like these before unconscionability
was formally adopted, judges would bite the metaphorical puzzle pieces
of other recognized legal doctrines, like duress and undue influence, in
order to apply the doctrine to cases before them which did not absolutely
conform to the black letter doctrine. 17 Otherwise, if the facts did not fit
the puzzles of the contract defenses exactly, judges would have had no
choice but to enforce grossly unfair contracts— a cling to judicial
formalism which did not make sense, nor seemed just. Unsurprisingly,
this spawned concerns over judicial distortion of traditional contract law
and unpredictability of judicial decision making.18
Therefore,
unconscionability was codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (the
“UCC”) in 1952.19 Although the UCC applies exclusively to the sale of
goods moveable at the time of the contract,20 the formal adoption into the
UCC led to the recognition of the unconscionability doctrine in the
common law, 21 which governs contracts predominantly concerned with
services, or contracts related to the sale of real estate, insurance or other
intangible assets rather than goods, and in general all other types of
15
16

See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 169.

17
Id. at 175 (“The mass-produced boiler-plate ‘contracts,‘ necessitated and spawned by the
explosive growth of complex business transactions in a burgeoning population left courts frequently
frustrated in attempting to arrive at just results by applying many of the traditional contract-construing
stratagems.”). When courts adjust the prongs of other contract defenses to suit the cases before them it
is known as quasi-contract defenses. “Quasi” is one of those fun legal terms like “constructive” which
sound impressive but essentially mean that it is made up.
18
Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra n. 10 at 585.
19
“(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. (2) When it is claimed or appears to
the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.” U.C.C. § 2-302 (amended 2003).
20
“(1) ‘Goods’ means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at
the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities and things in action…” U.C.C. § 2-105.
21
“If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result,” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981).
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contracts.22 Whether the contract concerns primarily goods or services
determines whether or not the UCC or the common law applies. Of
course, many contracts contain both goods and services. For example,
when hiring a roofer to repair your roof—you pay for not only the
shingles and supplies, but also for the roofer to perform the service of the
repairs. Whichever predominates23 or costs more (as an indication of
which facet of the contract predominates)—the goods or the service—
determines how courts decide on the choice of law.24 Even though the
UCC and common law are both employed to interpret and adjudicate
contracts, there are differences between the two which create advantages
and disadvantages depending upon the situation, like how there are two
leagues in professional baseball—one league features the designated
hitter and the other does not. Thus, the decision over whether or not the
contract is predominantly concerned with goods or services, and which
law should apply, like the decision of whether or not to start David Ortiz
at first base in a National League park, is crucial and oftentimes leads to
spirited debates between adversaries, judges and Monday-morning
managers alike.25 26
Unconscionability is one of several of what are known in contract
law as contract defenses.27 A contracting party can try to prove
22

Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra n. 10 at 585; C & J Fertilizer, Inc., 227 N.W.2d at 180-81
(“Adding to the probability that unconscionability will be the stated basis for refusing to enforce
oppressive contracts or provisions in the future is the Uniform Commercial Code provision which
permits courts to police contracts on this basis. (T)he section is an express recognition of the basic
principle. Though the Code is technically applicable only to contracts for the sale of goods, its
influence cannot help but be felt in other types of transactions so that most of our courts can say what
they mean in refusing to enforce harsh contracts or provisions. Those who would obstruct the
development of the unconscionability concept on grounds of uncertainty, indefiniteness and judicial
lawmaking, must be characterized as misunderstanding the dynamic nature of the common law and
statutory interpretation.”).
23
Princess Cruises, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 143 F.3d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 444 (U.S. 1998).
24
Cf. Princess Cruises, Inc.; NIM Plastics Corp. v. Standex Intern. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1003
(N.D. Ill. 1998); Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir.
1983); In re American Export Lines, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 490, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
25
Not to mention these debates are popular hypothetical case questions featured on many Contracts
exams for first-year law students.
26
Of course, if the opposing starting pitcher is left-handed, “Big Papi” is probably best relegated to
a potential late-inning, pinch-hitter role, since, in his career, he is not only a subpar fielder but also a
left-handed hitter whose career batting average and on-base-plus-slugging percentage is significantly
lower
against
left-handed
starting
pitchers.
http://www.baseballreference.com/players/o/ortizda01.shtml, (last visited October 23, 2013).
27

1 Williston on Contracts § 1:1 (4th ed.).
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unconscionability like other contract defenses, such as duress, undue
influence, fraud and misrepresentation, in order to escape liability or to
avoid enforcement of a contract.28 In order to prove unconscionability,
in most jurisdictions a party must prove procedural and substantive
unconscionability.29 A determination of unconscionability must focus on
the relative positions of the parties, the adequacy of the bargaining
position, the meaningful alternatives available to the plaintiff, and the
existence of unfair terms in the contract.30
Procedural unconscionability is understood as the disadvantage in
bargaining power suffered by the weaker party in the formation of the
contract, and, if present, will occur in the time period up to when the
contract is formed.31 This includes so called “take it or leave it”
contracts, better known as contracts of adhesion. These contracts by
their very nature indicate that there is extreme inequality in bargaining
power between the contracting parties. 32 Procedurally unconscionable

“Parties are generally free to contract as they wish, and courts will enforce contracts according to
their plain meaning, unless induced by [contract defenses like] fraud, duress, or undue influence.”
Cordry v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Finance, Inc., 445 F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Util. Serv.
& Maint., Inc. v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 163 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Mo. Banc 2005)).
28

29
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1746 (U.S. 2011) (““A finding of
unconscionability requires “a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on
‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’
results.”); See also Summers v. Crestview Apartments, 2010 MT 164, 357 Mont. 123, 236 P.3d 586
(2010) (“Unconscionability requires a two-fold determination: that the contractual terms are
unreasonably favorable to the drafter and that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the other
party regarding acceptance of the provisions.”); see also Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, 737 S.E.2d 640
(W. Va. 2012) (“A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in
bargaining position, nor even because the inequality results in allocation of risks to the weaker party;
but gross inadequacy in bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger
party, may confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion or
may show that the weaker party had no meaningful, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or
appear to assent to the unfair terms.”) (emphasis added).
30
State ex rel. AT & T Mobility, LLC v. Wilson, 703 S.E.2d 543 (2010).
31
See, e.g. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); See also
C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Tunkl v. The
Regents of the University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92 (1963); The Original Great American Chocolate
Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir.1992); Summers v.
Crestview Apartments, 2010 MT 164 (2010).
32
Grayiel v. Appalachian Energy Partners 2001-D, LLP, 736 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 2012) (“A
contract of adhesion should receive greater scrutiny than a contract with bargained-for terms to
determine if it imposes terms that are oppressive, unconscionable, or beyond the reasonable
expectations of an ordinary person.”).
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contracts involve oppression by the dominant party and usually surprise
by the subservient party due to unequal bargaining power.33
Substantive unconscionability is the unfairness of the actual
terms of the contract alone.34 A term is substantively unconscionable
where it is one-sided or overly harsh,35 shocking to the conscience,
monstrously harsh, or exceedingly calloused.36 It also pertains to
situations where important terms are hidden in a maze of fine print or
legalese.37 Sometimes just the presence alone of an extremely one-sided
passage or clause can lead to the inference that the passage or clause, or
even the entire contract in question is unconscionable.38 Unlike
procedural unconscionability, substantive unconscionability can only
occur during the time period of the creation of the contract.
However, if the terms “shock the conscience” to the point where
no reasonable person would ever had agreed to them, there may not need
to be substantive unconscionability to pair with the procedural
unconscionability, as the overwhelming nature of the procedural
unconscionability may be sufficient.39 However, the opposite is not true,
i.e. you cannot prove unconscionability by only proving substantive
unconscionability.
The legal doctrine of unconscionability is a judge-centered
doctrine, meaning it is judges and not juries that make the determination
as to whether or not a contract is unconscionable. The party asserting the
unconscionability has the burden of proof. Once a determination of
unconscionability has been made, courts have a few options—they may
33

AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S.Ct. at 1746.
E.g. Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enterprises, Inc., 293 P.3d 1197 (Wash. 2013); Williams, 350
F.2d 445; C&J Fertilizer, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 169; Tunkl, 60 Cal.2d 92; The Original Great American
Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc., 970 F.2d 273, 281; Summers, 2010 MT 164 (2010); Grayiel, 736
S.E.2d 91.
35
AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S.Ct. at 1746.
36
Gandee, 293 P.3d 1197 (Wash. 2013)
34

37

AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S.Ct. at 1746.
Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir.) (“The doctrine of unconscionability, closely allied as it is to fraud and duress,
is designed to prevent overreaching at the contract-formation stage. The presence of a commercially
unreasonable term, in the sense of a term that no one in his right mind would have agreed to, can be
relevant to drawing an inference of unconscionability but cannot be equated to it.”)
38

39
Cf. Williams at 450 (“But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice,
signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely
that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms”).
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not enforce the entire contract, sever the unconscionable portion of the
contract and enforce the rest, or limit a provision’s application.40
Embedded also in the principle is what has been coined the doctrine of
reasonable expectations.41 In situations where there is a contract of
adhesion (i.e. a procedurally unconscionable contract) courts may look to
the reasonable expectations of the parties and interpret any nonbargained for terms according to the reasonable expectations of the nondrafting party.42
As mentioned above, unconscionability is a recognized contract
defense in the sale of goods, in the sale of services and in general all
other types of contracts. While not apparently clear, included in the “all
other types of contracts” are contracts for electronic information, which
have their own unique distinction since electronic information is not a
“good” as defined under the UCC (for example, electronic information is
not a good movable at the time of the contract) nor is it primarily a
service which would place it under the penumbra of the common law.
As a result of these emerging transactions in the digital world, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the
“NCCUSL,” now known as the Uniform Law Commission or the
“ULC”) promulgated the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act (“UCITA”) in 1999, and further amended it in 2000 and 2002, to
address these shortcomings in the UCC.43 UCITA was a drafted state
law, proposed for inclusion under section 2B of the UCC, and intended
to create a useable and uniform set of rules to govern transactions related
to computer information. In particular, UCITA attempted to codify rules
regarding end-user license agreements (EULAs) such as shrinkwraps,
clickwraps and browsewraps. In fact, UCITA was at least partially
borne by the failed attempts to modify the UCC to validate shrinkwrap
contracts.44 UCITA generally validated the usage of all EULAs, as long
40

Gandee v. LDL Freedon Enterprises, Inc., 293 P.3d 1197 (Wash. 2013).

41

See C&J Fertilizer, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 169.
See Id.

42
43

Uniform Law Commission, Computer Information Transactions Act Summary,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Computer%20Information%20Transactions%20
Act, (last visited October 23, 2013).
44
Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. 1125, 1140
(Fall 2000).
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as the user was given an opportunity to return the goods (at the seller’s
expense) if the license terms were found to be objectionable. As of the
date of this writing, UCITA has only been adopted in two states—
Virginia and Maryland—despite attempts in other states.45

III. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO END-USER LICENSE
AGREEMENTS (EULAs)
A. Evolution from Shrinkwrap to Clickwrap to Browsewrap
Like radiation from cell phones and microwaves, many computer
users have already been exposed to EULAs without probably even
realizing it. They have their own taxonomy and have added new words
into the legal and computer science lexicon—namely shrinkwrap,
clickwrap and browsewrap.
Shrinkwraps are EULAs that are included in the package with the
product that is purchased online and which the end-user does not have a
chance to review until he or she receives the box shipped to his or her
door.46 A shrinkwrap end-user license agreement typically involves (1)
notice of a license agreement on product packaging, (2) presentation of
the full license on documents inside the package, and (3) prohibited
access to the product without an express indication of acceptance.47
Generally, in the shrinkwrap context, the consumer does not accept the
shrinkwrap terms at the time of purchase; instead, the consumer
manifests assent to the terms by later actions.48 If this seems somewhat
strange, it is: in normal contract situations, purchasers are afforded the
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract prior to paying the
seller, at least in theory (how many consumers haggle with the Home
Depot salesperson about arbitration and indemnification clauses?). The
term shrinkwrap comes from the fact that software packages are usually
45
UCITA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_Computer_Information_Transactions_Act, (last
visited October 23, 2013).
46
47
48

Id. at 1134.
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2nd Cir. 2004).
Id.
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covered in cellophane “shrinkwrap” and that some vendors have written
end-user licenses that become effective as soon as the customer tears the
cellophane from the package.49
Clickwraps are the most common EULA that users have
encountered. They are the Tolstoy-esque, laundry list of terms that
appear when one tries to open an online account or begin an online
service—they are the primary means of forming contracts online.50
Moreover, they are standardized, mass-market contracts promulgated by
service providers to reduce transaction costs.51 As the name suggests,
clickwraps require the user to click a button to manifest assent to the
terms of the contract.52 Sometimes, instead of a dialog box or a pop-up
window opening with the actual terms of service, the website will post
an embedded hyperlink which will require you to follow the link
separately, and then acknowledge that you have read and agree to the
terms of the contract by clicking “I Accept.” Furthermore, when a
website uses a clickwrap agreement, the end-user is forced to make a
decision whether or not to accept the website’s term of service before
being granted access to the site.53
Browsewraps are essentially an attenuated type of clickwrap
agreement—they involve the same laundry list of terms but require the
end-user to do less work. Typically with websites employing the usage
of browsewraps, the terms of service will be embedded as a hyperlink in
a prominent place somewhere on the page.54 However, browsewraps do
not require the consumer to do anything other than continue to use the
website, an example of a contract accepted by performance. 55 Unlike
clickwrap agreements, browsewrap agreements “[do] not require the user
to manifest assent to the terms and conditions expressly…[a] party

49

ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).

50
Id. (“On the internet, the primary means of forming a contract are the so-called “clickwrap” (or
“click-through”) agreements, in which website users typically click an “I agree” box after being
presented with a list of terms and conditions of use”).
51
Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459 (December 2006).
52
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F.Supp.2d 585, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2004).
53
54
55

Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 429.
Kwan v. Clearwire Corp., No. C09-1392JLR, 2012 WL 32380 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2012).
Id.
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instead gives his assent simply by using the website.”56 One does not
even need to read the terms of service (which is often the case).57
VI.

BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACT LAW AND
COURT INTERPRETATION OF EULAs

Contract law is designed to protect the expectations of the
contracting parties.58 A contract is “a promise or set of promises for
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes a duty.”59 In contract law, binding legal
contracts are comprised of three essential elements: offer, acceptance and
consideration.60 All three terms are legal terms of art. An offer is “a
promise which is in its terms conditional upon an act, forbearance or
return promise being given in exchange for promise or its
performance”61 and an acceptance is a “manifestation of assent,” 62 a
consent between two parties involving an affirmative action to do
something rather than passive acquiescence in accepting something.63
Consideration is each party providing something of value which induces
the other party to enter the contract agreement.64 In most contracts, the
consideration is currency; however, it can be anything of value, like a
promise to do or not to do something.
In general, the waters surrounding the validity of EULAs are
murky. Courts are concerned with the element of acceptance,65 and
whether or not the user had notice of the agreement and assented to it.66
56
Hines, 668 F.Supp.2d at 366-67 (quoting Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No, 06CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761 at *4 (N.D.Tex. September 12, 2007).
57
Specht, 150 F.Supp.2d at 594.
58
1 Williston on Contracts § 1:1 (4th ed.).
59

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1.
Cf, Banning Co. v. People of State of Cal., 240 U.S. 142 (1916); Minster Farms Coop. Exchange
Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 884 N.E.2d 1056 (2008).
61
Interstate Industries, Inc. v. Barclay Industries, Inc., 540 F.2d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 1976).
60

62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Radin, Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. at 1125.
17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 102 (2d ed., database updated August 2013).
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2009).
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Did the end-user at the time of the contract have sufficient information
about the bargain he or she was making to have manifested a valid, legal
assent to it, or was the end-user railroaded or swindled into doing so? In
dicta, then Judge Sotomayor, sitting on the bench of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, wrote in her majority opinion
that “a consumer's clicking on a download button does not communicate
assent to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the
consumer that clicking on the download button would signify assent to
those terms.”67 This question has more teeth under the proposed
UCITA, since UCITA relaxes the traditional legal definition of
acceptance to encumber mere passive assent rather than affirmative
manifestation of assent.68 Recall that the unconscionability doctrine is
concerned with stronger parties exploiting their extremely powerful
bargaining position to bully weaker parties into accepting terms they
would not otherwise have agreed to, and also with stronger parties
swindling weaker parties to sign contracts with extremely one-sided
terms hidden like Waldo in the middle of fine print.69 Therefore,
acceptance becomes an important question when considering EULAs
under general contract legal theory.
In most circumstances, shrinkwraps and clickwraps are more
likely to be upheld than browsewraps;70 however, there has been much
debate as to the validity and enforceability of EULAs in general.71
Whereas courts traditionally applied the unconscionability doctrine to
contracts which were extremely one-sided, courts now apply the doctrine
with increasing frequency to strike down contracts that were
promulgated using unfair procedures and which contain unfair
provisions.72 Many courts have found that EULAs are enforceable as
long as their terms are reasonable and are not objectionable on any other
contract grounds,73 such as unconscionability.74 An area of primary
67

Specht, at 39.

68

Radin, Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. at 1141-42.
Section II, supra.

69
70

Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459 (December 2006).
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Kwan, 2012 WL 32380 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 3, 2012); Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F.Supp.2d 585, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), aff’d 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2004); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2nd Cir.
2004).
72
E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.27 (2d ed. 1990).
71

73

ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447 (1996).
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concern is whether or not the user had reasonable notice of the
agreement and was actually able to manifest assent to it.75 In the
contract world, contracts are often modified by one of the contracting
parties in return for increased consideration. With EULAs, the stronger
party may sometimes unilaterally change the terms of the agreement
prior to payment or performance by the weaker party. In these situations
courts have held the EULA to be unenforceable.76 Another concern is
whether or not the agreement adequately informed the consumer of their
right to reject the contract and the method of rejection. Without knowing
the escape to an unusually one-sided contract that the consumer
ordinarily would not have entered, the consumer may feel that he or she
has no choice but to enter the contract.77
In the case of shrinkwrap agreements, courts will generally
uphold the validity of the contract as long as the end-user had adequate
time to return the product upon receiving it with the terms of service.78
Courts tend not to find shrinkwrap EULAs unconscionable merely
because the buyer did not have a chance to review the terms of service
prior to purchasing the product and opening the package.79 One of the
first major decisions to announce the validity of shrinkwraps was the
ProCD v. Zeidenberg case—a controversial case that would impact the
way that courts review end-user license agreements.80 Matt Zeidenberg,
a graduate student, purchased software on CD-ROM from ProCD at their
non-commercial price. To recoup the investment costs of creating the
software, ProCD charged two different prices depending upon the users
intended usage: non-commercial or commercial. Zeidenberg began
selling the software to others online for a fee cheaper than the
commercial version. ProCD sued him for violations of its license
agreement, which was included in the package as a shrinkwrap
agreement.81 Judge Easterbrook, a famous judge and economist sitting
74

Id. at 1449.

75

See Specht.
Saver v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1 (3d Cir. 1991).

76
77

DeFontes v. Dell, 984 A.2d 1061 (R.I. 2009).
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Meridian Project Systems, Inc. v.
Hardin Const. Co., LLC, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Cal 2006).
79
ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447 (1996).
78

80

Id.
In addition, once he loaded the CD-ROM onto his machine, a dialog box opened up which
required him to click on it to accept. This is another form of EULA—the clickwrap.
81
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on the bench of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, concluded that in most circumstances, shrinkwrap licenses
should be enforced, as long as the consumer could return the product for
a refund after being given a chance to review the terms.82 In
Easterbrook’s mind as long as the end-user had the option to return the
product upon review of the terms of service (without even actual proof
that the end-user did read the terms, which, in this case, there was
evidence to suggest that Zeidenberg did not read the terms), it was
sufficient to conclude that the end-user was not forced to accept the
terms of the contract and, thus, the contract would be validly binding and
enforced.83 Other courts have followed suit and found constructive enduser acceptance of the terms of contracts merely since the users do not
return the products upon review of the terms of service—the same kind
of tacit acceptance of the terms of service construed by performance as
was present in ProCD.84
Clickwraps are different from shrinkwraps in that there is a
requirement that the end-user click the “I Accept” button in order to
manifest assent.85 Essentially the same principles above are applicable
in the case of clickwrap contracts—if the end-user has the ability to
scroll through the additional terms prior to clicking “I Accept,” then
there is sufficient notice and the clickwrap is deemed valid.86 However,
due to the take-it-or-leave-it nature of clickwrap agreements rather than
the meeting-of-the-minds bargaining in offline contracting, the notion of
assent is attenuated.87

82

Id.

83

Id.
Cf. Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed.Cir. 2003); Morgan
Laboratories Inc. v. Micro Data Base Systems, Inc., No. C96-3998 THE, 1997 WL 258886 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 22, 1997); Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 48 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d 489 (N.D. Cal 2002).
84

85
Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F.Supp.2d 585, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) aff’d
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2004).
86
Cf. ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447 (1996); i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 32, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[the party to the contract] explicitly accepted the clickwrap license
agreement when it clicked on the box stating ‘I Agree’”); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J.
Super. 118, 732 A.2d 528 (App. Div. 1999); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp.2d 229 (E.D.Pa.
2007); In re RealNetworks, Inc. Privacy Litigation, No. 00-1366, 2000 WL 631341 (D. Ill. May 8,
2000); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, No. 98-20064, 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998)
87

Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459, 466 (December 2006).
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Browsewraps expand on the theory of performance as acceptance
introduced as a result of the promulgation of shrinkwraps. 88 If one
continues to use the website, even if there is no “I Accept” box to click
to manifest one’s assent, one is considered to have tacitly accepted the
terms of service of the website by continuing to use it.89 Courts,
however, have a more difficult time interpreting the validity of
browsewrap agreements and whether or not they should be enforceable.
The name of the game is acceptance—browsewrap agreements by their
very nature create questions as to whether the end-user has actual or
constructive notice of the license agreement and whether the end-user
has accepted them.90 Courts that have refused to enforce browsewraps
have done so in order to protect the consumer, and, conversely, when
they have been enforced, it has been against commercial entities.91
While this paper is primarily concerned with the plight of the individual
end-user and because courts are more likely to flex their muscles to
protect ordinary citizens as justice requires, the concept of manifesting
assent through performance in this method, is concerning to businesses
as well. While large corporations will presumably have safeguards in
place to prevent

V. HOW EULAs ARE UNCONSCIONABLE
EULAs are both procedurally and substantively unconscionable
by their very nature. The Kings of the Service Provider Realm routinely
exploit their feudal positions and regal bargaining powers to craft harsh
and extremely one-sided Terms of Service contracts which serfs are
forced into accepting. Feudal resistance is futile. The Kings rule from
the throne by decree without having to provide meaningful notice to the
serfs of the terms. The decrees in and of themselves are contracts of
adhesion—users, like serfs, have no real options but to accept the terms
or not use the service. Worse, the Kings sometimes act the jester to
88

Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).

89

Id.
Kwan, 2012 WL 32380 at *7.

90
91

Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 459.
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swindle the serfs by hiding harsh terms somewhere in the contract and
profiting from them in ways never even contemplated by the serfs (as if
there was a choice). Further, even if serfs are advised of altered terms in
the contract, the Crown provides no additional compensation or
consideration. Kings like Facebook and Twitter wield unchecked power
and create their own kingdoms and laws of the land. As Mel Brooks
astutely observed, it’s good to be the king.92
But feudal times have passed—today, such unconscionable
tactics are no longer tolerated in the realm of ordinary contract law. No
longer should they be tolerated in the realm of online contracting either.
A.

Lack of Notice

Without adequate notice to the user of changes in the terms of a
contract, how can it truly be said that the user has agreed to the changes?
If the user has not agreed to the changes of the contract, how can the
contract be considered binding? While face-to-face contracts formed in
such an unconscionable manner would be deemed unenforceable, this is
a routine occurrence in the online contracting world. For proof, all the
reader needs to do is compare the Terms of Service when his or her
account was created on whatever social media site he or she belongs to
with the Terms of Service now. Chances are the site may have sent out a
notice, either via electronic mail or a posting on the site home page when
the changes were made, but, the truth is, it probably would not have
made any difference. The user probably deleted the spam from his or her
inbox and hurriedly bypassed the posting on the home page to look at
pictures of pets in Halloween costumes. And this is exactly what the
party that promulgated the notice wanted—getting away with extremely
one-sided terms in a contract is much easier if the other party has not
even read it.93

92

HISTORY OF THE WORLD, PART 1 (20th Century Fox 1981).
93
See Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1327,
1342, n. 74 (Summer 2011). A study conducted by New York University found that “only about one
or two in one thousand shoppers” of software access a product's EULA for at least one second. As
evidence, the study cites news of a computer game retailer that included a clause in its online contract
that gave it a right to the “souls” of 7,500 of its online customers. The customers had the option of
nullifying the soul-claiming clause but very few did so. While contracts of adhesion are egregious,
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Further highlighting the lack of meaningful notice, even users
who set aside the weekend (or two) it takes to read the terms of service
may not even notice the unfavorable or one-sided terms. By crafting
“tomes” of service dozens of pages long, service providers can instruct
their lawyers to be unabashedly one-sided, while shrewdly hiding behind
the veil of thoroughness and security. The results are incredibly verbose
contracts that would strain the focus of parties used to these sorts of
writings, such as lawyers, editors and other sadists. It might as well be
the contract that Charlie Bucket signed to gain access to the Chocolate
Factory.94 This problem is further accentuated in the virtual world. In
the real world, the drafters have to pay for the contract to be printed.
While this may seem de minimis in individual instances, in the case of
mass-market contracts (which is what EULAs are), drafters exert much
effort into keeping the contract lengths to a minimum because of printing
costs. Therefore, drafters have to balance out the need for thoroughness,
security, and inclusion of all sorts of favorable terms with the necessity
of keeping operating costs down. In the virtual world this is not a
problem—there is no page limit.
Furthermore, by making the contract longer you increase the
likelihood that the other party is not going to even bother reading it.
This makes it more likely that service providers can get away with hiding
unfavorable or one-sided terms in the middle of long sections or
paragraphs. This is the unconscionable trickery that many service
providers employ to include so-called “crook provisions” into their
contracts. 95 A crook provision is the term Nancy Kim coined for unbargained for provisions which lead to increased revenue for the
dominant party which the user is usually unaware of, and probably

they are dealing with access to computer software. Hiding property (intellectual property?) claims to
one’s soul (soul-squatting?) in the terms of service is arguably the ultimate unconscionable provision.
94
WILLY WONKA & THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY (Paramount Pictures 1971). The font size in the
contract Charlie signs famously gets smaller and smaller until it is no longer readable. Grandpa Joe
was not a lawyer, nor was one offered to him by Willy Wonka, but had Charlie retained counsel, it is
extremely doubtful that the contract would have been enforceable, as contract defenses such as
unconscionability, duress, undue influence and misrepresentation abound…
95
Terms of Service: Didn’t Read is a user rights initiative website that review Terms of Service
provisions for unfair terms and crook provisions. Their motto is “’I have read and agree to the Terms’
is the biggest lie on the web. We aim to fix that.” The website reviews the Terms of Service of various
websites and assign ratings to their Terms of Service—Class A being good to one extreme and Class E
being bad to the other. TERMS OF SERVICE; DIDN’T READ, http://tosdr.org/, (last visited December 4,
2013).
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would not have consented to if he or she had been aware.96 These ninjalike provisions are often un-related to the product at all,97 and afford the
issuer access to completely new revenue streams.98 99 Even where
ordinary contracts of adhesion reduce the value of the bargain to the
consumer by limiting warranties and including certain exclusions, they
typically do not seek to extract additional benefits from consumers that
were not related to the substance of the original transaction without the
consumer actually manifesting assent to it.100 The example that Kim
uses is the hotel that charges an additional fee for late check-outs and
requires the customer to separately initial the rate and late check-out fee.
101
At least in this scenario the customer is aware of the extra charge.
With crook provisions in EULAs, the customer is normally unaware.
Because of judicial recognition of the acceptability of certain
shrinkwraps, clickwraps and browsewraps, and because companies are
no longer constrained by the prospects of high printing costs in a virtual
96
Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain. Prior to shrinkwraps, clickwraps and
browsewraps, Kim describes contracts as containing primarily “shield” and “sword” provisions.
“Shield” provisions refer to those that serve to limit liability; “sword” provisions refer to those that
affirmatively terminate the rights of another party. Crook provisions have opened up a Pandora’s Box
of unfavorable contract terms.
97
Id. at 1344.
98
For a great example of a recent crook provision, in December 2012, Instagram announced they
were changing their terms of service effective January 16, to include the following: “A business or
other entity may pay" Instagram to display users' photos and other details "in connection with paid or
sponsored content or promotions, without any compensation to you." They further altered the provision
whereby the user grants a “limited license” to Instagram to use their content. In the new term,
Instagram makes this limited license a “sub-licensable” agreement, clearing the way for Instagram to
sell your pictures to retail stores for use in promotions without any compensation to the user. Julianne
Pepitone,
Instagram
can
now
sell
your
photos
for
ads,
CNNMONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/18/technology/social/instagram-sellphotos/index.html?iid=s_mpm#comments (December 18, 2012).
99
Examples of other crook provisions from various Terms of Service: Google can share user
personal information with third parties; SoundCloud can disclose user personal information in case of
business transfer or insolvency; the copyright license the user grants Youtube is worldwide, nonexclusive and royalty-free which is sublicenseable and transferable, and can be used without limitation
for promotion of the service in any media format with Youtube or any of its successors and affiliates;
GitHub requires the user to defend and indemnify GitHub against any claims, demands, suits or
proceedings made regarding the user’s uploaded content (this is a crook provision as it is doubtful the
user knows of its presence in the Terms of Service and because GitHub avoids the costs of suit); the
copyright license entitles Twitpic to distribute user content to media entities; Delicious can license user
content to third-parties; Amazon will track users on other websites, enables third-party advertisers to
target users, and Amazon may sell user data as part of a business transfer; Netflix reserves the right to
disclose personal info without notification; users grant Spotify perpetual licenses to any published
media. TERMS OF SERVICE; DIDN’T READ, http://tosdr.org/, (last visited December 4, 2013).
100
Id. at 1343.
101

Id.
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world, companies are emboldened to include these types of crook
provisions in their Terms of Service. The browsewrap of one social
networking site gives the owners of the site an “irrevocable, perpetual,
nonexclusive, fully-paid and worldwide license” to user content,102 a
provision that a user probably would have had an issue with had he or
she actually read the contract, at least not without additional
consideration.103 EULAs are unconscionable when service providers
hide these “crook” provisions, or other equally extremely one-sided
terms in the contract. The user does not have notice—adequate or
otherwise—of the provisions, and therefore cannot manifest a legallybinding assent. In the same way, some service providers require the user
to remain abreast of changes to the Terms of Service, and have eschewed
responsibility to affirmatively notify users of material changes to the
agreement altogether, shifting the burden to the user to remain aware of
changes they did not make and did not assent to.
B.

Contracts of Adhesion and Unequal Bargaining Power

Unconscionability occurs in scenarios where one party exercises
its extreme bargaining power over the weaker party and presents the
other party with take-it-or-leave-it contracts of adhesion. 104 Contracts of
adhesion by their very nature are presumptively unconscionable because
had the parties been more equal the terms would not be nearly as onesided.105 Large companies regularly use their superior bargaining power
to tip the contracting scales in their favor. Part of the reality of doing
business is that there is often this kind of inequality in the course of
dealings. Like chip leaders at the poker table, superior parties often
dictate the action and, sometimes, bully the weaker parties. It is one of
the spoils of being the chip leader in the industry. It is when the weaker
party is forced to accept an exceptionally one-sided contract or set of
102
Id. at 1342 (referring to Friendster’s Terms of Service [See Friendster Terms of Service,
http://www.friendster.com/info/tos.php (last visited Jan. 16. 2011)]).
103
104

Section VI(C), infra.
Section VI(C), infra.

105
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Cf. Grayiel v.
Appalachian Energy Partners 2001-D, LLP, 736 S.E.2d 91 (W.Va. 2012); C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied
Mutual Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
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terms that is exceptionally one-sided that the contract approaches
unconscionability.
By way of illustration, consider when a consumer purchases a car
from a dealership. The consumer knows (or should know) that the cost
of the car to the dealership is considerably less than he or she is paying
for it. The consumer also knows about the destination charges and the
other fees the dealership adds. These are terms that tip the scale in favor
of the dealership yet, while one-sided, probably do not rise to the level of
unconscionability. If, however, the dealership added contract language
that stated that the purchaser must have all service on the vehicle for the
lifetime of the car performed at the dealership or else face a five hundred
dollar fine per occurrence, the contract would speed towards the
unconscionability threshold. Yet, even in this scenario, the consumer
could go to another dealership, as no reasonable person would accept
such a ridiculous provision. However, suppose the dealership was the
only dealership around for hundreds of miles, precluding the purchaser
from any other reasonable options, or that the dealership hid those terms
in a long, verbose contract, the contract would clearly be a contract of
adhesion and quickly speed pass the threshold into unconscionability.
As referenced in the fictional narrative in the Introduction, while
using social media is probably not a right, in a future where it may be the
quickest, cheapest, and perhaps only way to communicate with family or
loved-ones, especially considering the exponential growth rate of social
media sites like Facebook, Google+, YouTube, Pinterest, LinkedIn and
Twitter,106 and the increasing costs of cellular phones and data plans, the
black and white answers becomes increasingly grey. These large service
providers are essentially the only car dealerships around for hundreds of
miles; they accordingly assume a position of superior bargaining power
at the contracting table. Unequal bargaining power is a hallmark of
procedurally unconscionable contracts. Armed with the knowledge that
the user will ultimately accept whatever contract is put before him or her
by clicking or browsing, and because most social media websites are free
to the consumer, service providers can easily exploit their superior
bargaining power to tip the scale extremely in their own favor.

106
12 Awesome Social Media Facts and Statistics for 2013, JeffBullas.com (last visited November
9, 2013).
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Lack of Consideration

In the world of contracting outside of EULAs,107 additional terms
which materially change the nature of the original contract normally
have to be supported by additional consideration.108 Furthermore, the
modification of an existing contract cannot be done unilaterally by one
party—both parties must assent to the modification of terms in order for
the modification to be incorporated into the contract.109 This is not the
case with EULAs. In fact, one recent case found that a browsewrap
agreement that contained a provision which allowed for unilateral
changes to the Terms of Service by the service provider was
unenforceable.110 Service providers routinely change the Terms of
Service agreements without additional consideration to the user. In fact,
even though courts have held that the user will not be bound to changes
in the Terms of Service if the website does not notify the user of them,111
some service providers get around this by advising the user only that a
change has occurred. The service provider then requires the user to
reconnoiter for the changes in the Tomes of Service, or, in the
alternative, simply continue to use the website in order to manifest
assent.
This of course is the sketchy browsewrap practice of
performance as acceptance. For an example, consider this excerpt from
the first line of Yahoo’s Terms of Service: “Yahoo! Inc. ("Yahoo")
welcomes you. Yahoo provides the Yahoo Services (defined below) to
you subject to the following Terms of Service ("TOS"), which may be
107
And contracting situations other than those between two merchants, as such situations involve
interpretation of the UCC: “modifications of contracts under the UCC need not be supported by
additional consideration as long as the modifications are done in good faith.” See U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt
1. (amended 2003). Usually this is because of some frustration of purpose or occurrence of an
reasonably unforeseen event which makes the modification to the contract necessary in order to
preserve its value. An example of this type of event is an Act of God, such as a tornado in an area of
the country where it is not reasonable to have such weather, which in turn adversely affects the terms
of a contract. If the tornado occurred in Kansas it could be hardly be characterized as unforeseen, as
compared to if the tornado occurred in Newark, New Jersey.
108
Volvo Const. Equipment North America, Inc. v. CLM Equipment Company, Inc., 386 F.3d 581,
598 (4th Cir. 2004).
109
Baptist Physician Hosp. Organization, Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Services, Inc., 415 F.
Supp. 2d 835 (E.D. Tenn. 2006), order aff'd, 481 F.3d 337, 2007 FED App. 0107P (6th Cir. 2007)
(applying Tenn. law).
110
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updated by us from time to time without notice to you….By accessing
and using the Yahoo Services, you accept and agree to be bound by the
terms and provision of the TOS” (emphasis added).112 Yahoo does not
even notify the user of the actual changes to the terms. Further, Yahoo
only requires the user to continue using its services to manifest assent to
changes that the user did not even have to realize were made with any
level of substantive particularity in the first place. The laws of contracts
require that there be additional consideration from both sides to actually
demonstrate the change was valid and legally binding113—how can this
be done when one party acts unilaterally without any additional
consideration to the other side? Where is the acceptance?
VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE
A.

Line-item Clicking and More Effective Notice

If a company wishing to engage in online contracting was
required to make all paragraphs or sections clickable, that is, consentable
by a click of the mouse, it would go a long way towards manifesting a
legally-binding assent to the EULA. Either the user agrees to the terms
and clicks it, thereby incorporating it into the contract, or the section gets
thrown out, shifting the burden to the drafter to reach out to the
consumer for further discussion. Only if the company reaches out to the
consumer and both parties agree will the rejected terms have any
possibility of being reincorporated into the contract. Companies
complaining about the potential expense of increasing the size of its
customer service department can be told that either it’s the cost of doing
business or remove all unreasonable terms from their contracts.
The same result can be achieved even if the user is not required
to click and assent to all sections, but only some sections. Perhaps a
portion of the EULA is predetermined and any further provisions are
made clickable. The predetermined portions could be anything from
adoption of the default terms of contracts from the UCC or newly-minted
112

Yahoo Terms of Service (last
http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/.
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terms agreed upon by consumer advocacy groups, scholars, ALI,114
contract law professors, lobbyists and adopted into state law (following
the footsteps of UCITA but hopefully with a better than two-out-of-fiftystate outcome). In either of these scenarios, even the biggest skeptic who
says that users will mindlessly click through the sections115 or skip
through the line-item assent process altogether in an effort to get to the
videos of kittens playing keyboards116 can be assured that even the
mindless clickers will be protected from the extremely one-sided terms
that litter the current EULA landscape. By requiring users to separately
assent to any further terms, including crook provisions, the user retains a
degree of power that he or she does not currently have. While some, if
not most, users will simply click through mindlessly, there will be at
least a portion of the users that will take the time to review the terms, or
at least some of them, before assenting to them. This would give prudent
consumers similar authority as courts that employ the doctrine of
reasonable expectations in considering the unconscionability of specific
contracts—one-sided terms or crook provisions would be culled.
There is also the possibility that the act of shining a spotlight on
the drafters will do the trick. If the unconscionable terms and crook
provisions that drafters of EULAs have regularly embedded or hidden in
contracts are now brought to the forefront, perhaps it will now give the
drafters pause prior to continuing this practice any further. Companies
wishing to avoid persecution in the court of public opinion and liability
in the courts of the several states would be wise not to include extremely
one-sided terms in their agreements. Once companies are aware that an
increasing number of contracting users and countless consumer advocacy
groups will be on the lookout for such unconscionable contracting terms,
the threat of discovery alone may be enough to police these terms out of
the EULAs altogether, or at least minimize them. The theory behind
114
At least on the surface, this appears to be a perfect task for the ALI. The American Law
Institute (ALI) was founded in the first quarter of the 20 th century. According to their website: “The
American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the United States producing
scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve the law. The Institute (made up of 4000
lawyers, judges, and law professors of the highest qualifications) drafts, discusses, revises, and
publishes Restatements of the Law, model statutes, and principles of law that are enormously
influential in the courts and legislatures, as well as in legal scholarship and education.” About ALI, The
American Law Institute.com, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview (last visited
November 9, 2013).
115

The author being among the skeptics.
Charlie Schmidt’s Keyboard Cat! – THE ORIGINAL!, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J--aiyznGQ (last visited November 9, 2013).
116
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this is the same one behind why people slow down on the highways that
feature the “Speed Monitored By Aircraft” sign even though it is
essentially an empty threat,117 or how the “warning” from a pool owner
that a chemical in the pool will form a purple circle around the guilty
party if it detects urine in the water will keep patrons from relieving
themselves in the pool:118 the threat of discovery trumps the reward.
After all, the Internet is abundant with online communities
banding together on the grass roots level for the purposes of political
activism119—the threat of negative publicity could be all of the police
power required to force service providers to change. For example, from
2008 to 2012, the number of social networking site users has grown from
33% of the online population to 69% of the online population. In 2012,
39% of all adults took part in some kind of political activity using social
networking sites—meaning more Americans used social networking
sites for political activist purposes in 2012 than used them at all in
2008.120 Further, discussions on social networking sites can lead to
further engagement with political issues.121 Once online communities
become aware of continued unconscionable tactics by service providers,
it is becoming increasingly likely in this climate of increased online
activism, that there will be increased online mobilization for change.
How ironic would it be if the social networking services provided by the
guilty parties were used to mobilize against them?
In order to not risk “losing the forest for the trees,” EULAs
should be limited to a certain number of pages or words, and should also
be limited to specific fonts and colors. Hypothetically speaking, a
shrewd company may strategically choose to increase the lengths of its
agreement in 8-point, red, Comic Sans MS, banking on the premise that
117
Jason Bittel, Do Police Really Use Aircraft to Enforce Speed Limits?, Slate.com,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/05/30/_speed_limit_enforced_by_aircraft_do_police_re
ally_do_that.html (last visited November 9, 2013).
118

Id.
See Lauren Barack, Study: Young People of All Races Are Politically Active Online, THE
DIGITAL SHIFT, http://www.thedigitalshift.com/2012/07/digital-divide/study-young-people-of-allraces-are-politically-active-online/ (July 10, 2012); cf. Henrik Serup Christensen, Political activities
on the Internet: Slacktivism or political participation by other means?, FIRST MONDAY,
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3336/2767, (February 7, 2011).
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Aaron Smith, Civic Engagement in the Digital Age, PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
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of the small portion that even read the contract, only a few will hang around by
122
word 10,000 of contracts written like this.
Both the length of the contract and
that of the clickable section should be limited to a reasonable word
count, in the same way that the agreement should be limited to
reasonable fonts and colors. In addition, placing all material terms or
sections at the top of the contract in conspicuous locations, perhaps in
italics or bold-faced type, or underlining the important sections, and a
requirement to a reasonable extent that the terms are written in plain
language (not the Klingon language123 that is legalese) will also ensure
that the user can manifest a legally-binding assent. This would be more
effective if the standard portions of the EULAs were written by third
parties, such as the ALI, discussed previously. Even though lawyers are
notorious for taking a simple concept and burying it in legalese, the
process at least will focus on tidying up the language of the agreements,
while striving to make them more understandable to the common person,
which is, at best, not the current objective, and, at worst, the opposite
objective of what is occurring now.
B.

Consideration for Crook Provisions

Recall that the holy trinity of classical contracts is offer,
acceptance and consideration. Although money is the most popular form
of consideration, anything of value which is bargained for, whether it is a
performance of an action, or forbearance from an action, can serve as
valid, legally-binding consideration in the eyes of the courts. If asked—
instead of being unconscionably railroaded or swindled—users may
actually agree to one-sided crook provisions in Terms of Service
agreements in return for consideration. Even though most social media
sites are free, or at least the bare nuts-and-bolts memberships are free,
consideration can take many forms. For instance, service providers can
offer to increase the email or cloud storage capacity for users that agree
to let them sublicense material to third parties. Service providers like
122
See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F.Supp.2d 974, 981-82 (E.D.Cal.2000). The court in this
case expressed concern that the browsewrap in question, which was linked to from the homepage, was
written in small, gray text on a gray background, making it difficult to read. The court further noted
that the link itself on the homepage was not underlined, which is common practice on the Internet.
123
Klingon language, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Klingon_language (last visited December 2,
2013).
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LinkedIn that offer a base-level, free service but also include a paid-for,
upgraded service, like LinkedIn Premium, can offer a discount or free
service for a period of time.124 Perhaps service providers can even offer
perks like rewards points, gift cards and other discount plans—the main
objective is affording the user the opportunity to opt in of his or her own
volition and maintain an element of power on his or her side of the
bargaining table. The offer of increased consideration for the user will
draw attention to the provisions. Thus, the consideration serves to
legitimize the substance of the additional or modified terms of the
contract by ensuring that the user was aware of the agreed upon terms.
Turning the table somewhat, perhaps users could negotiate their
own one-sided provisions in return for consideration from the service
provider, such as authorizing the service provider to sublicense their
content. For example, users may want the forum selection clause to be
their own home state or a neighboring state with more favorable
consumer protection laws, and may be willing to make a concession on a
crook provision or may be willing to pay a nominal sum to the service
provider for it.125 By definition, this process would turn the formerly
one-sided contract “negotiations,” using the term loosely, into more of a
two-sided bargain deserving of being called a negotiation.
A more forward thinking idea is to have users enter separate
license agreements, or other types of contracts that authorize service
providers to access their user data, supported by separate consideration
with the service providers.126 Perhaps before or simultaneous to the
124

http://www.linkedin.com.
Although one possible concern is the disproportionate effect this may have on users who could
not afford to pay the sum required to receive these favorable terms, raising equal protection and due
process concerns. But as previously noted, there is other consideration outside of money.
125

126
An interesting parallel to the rights of end-users of social media sites can be made with the
rights of collegiate football and basketball players whose personally-identifiable information (other
than their names) was being commandeered for profiteering purposes by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (the NCAA) in their license agreement with E.A. Sports for usage of certain
player likenesses in video games, such as the annual NCAA College Football series. These likenesses
included skin tones, hometowns, height, weight, jersey numbers and position played—essentially all
identifiable information outside of player names—and were being exploited by the NCAA without any
consideration given to the collegiate players because of the NCAA’s tone-deaf clinging to the
antiquated concept of sport amateurism. Former players filed a class action suit against E.A. Sports,
the Collegiate Licensing Company (the CLC, which handles licensing rights for many universities) and
the NCAA for their share of the annual billion-dollar profits of the video game. Group licensing
agreements are commonplace in professional sports as each sport has its own players’ association;
however, players’ associations are currently forbidden by the NCAA. As of the date of this writing, the
class, made up current collegiate football and basketball players (surprisingly, former athletes were left
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users’ review of the service provider’s Terms of Service, the users can
submit their personal license agreement to the service provider for
review. While most users would not be able to, or even want to, draft
their own license agreements, perhaps consumer advocacy groups, ALI,
or legislatures could draft a standard form license agreement for every
user to use. Service providers could even be compelled to provide the
standardized license agreement to users who require them. Consider it a
cost of doing business.
C.

Increased Federal Oversight and Penalties

Increased federal oversight may also assist to level the unequal
playing field. Perhaps new legislation primarily concerning the
promulgation of uniform online contracting, and the creation of a
concordant federal administrative agency to oversee its faithful
enforcement is the proper response.127 The legislation could police and
punish service providers who insist on incorporating unconscionable
tactics and terms in their Terms of Service agreements, with the
possibility of seeking sanctions, attorney’s fees, punitive damages,
statutory damages, and the creation of citizen-suit provisions, with
increased penalties for repeat offenders. Unique penalties included in
the legislation such as the threat of public disclosure to consumer
out) has received partial certification by the Ninth Circuit. E.A. Sports and the CLC have settled out of
court with the plaintiffs to an undisclosed amount, leaving the NCAA the only remaining defendant in
the case which is scheduled for trial in June. While a separate paper could be written on the syllogism
between the end-users and collegiate student-athletes, suffice it to say that the crook-esque provision,
or rather crook-esque tactics employed by the NCAA, namely the profiting at the expense of its
student-athletes without notification or compensation to the student-athletes themselves, represents an
important turning point in the fairness of license agreements that intend to feast off of the party with
little or no power at the contracting table, and with no reasonable alternatives but to acquiesce—the
very definition of what it means to be unconscionable. Legal scholars predict that the outcome one
way or the other may lead to the unionization of collegiate athletes, certainly with respect to former
athletes who were left out of the certified class. While unionization of end-users of social media sites
may not be reasonable or even feasible, certainly some sort of group action is not altogether
unforeseeable. A preliminary step in the right direction would be to have consumer advocacy groups or
third party groups such as the ALI draft standardized forms of EULAs as mentioned above.
127
The legislation should “primarily” be concerned with online contracting because, as over 200
years of American democracy has demonstrated, there will most assuredly be plenty of government
pork hidden in the fine print of the proposed bill. It is a good thing that the unconscionability doctrine
does not apply to legislative actions—under-handed and strong-armed tactics, which are condemned by
courts in contract law, are regularly employed by politicians. If the doctrine were applicable in this
area, it is questionable whether any legislation would be enforceable.
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advocacy groups, major news outlets, or correspondences to the
offending service provider’s entire user list of the specific
unconscionable tactic and/or provision (at the expense of the offending
service provider) could be included as a further deterrent for repeat
offenders.128
If after new legislation is passed, if there was a challenge to its
authority because of a conflict between the legislation and with the
offending terms in a EULA, the courts will probably find that the federal
legislation preempts the contract. It is true that courts will generally
respect the freedom of contract and do not lightly set aside freely-entered
agreements.129 The principle rests on the premise that it is in the best
interest of the public to give broad contracting powers through legally
enforceable agreements.130 However, because of the overwhelming
amount of procedural and substantive unconscionability encompassed in
EULAs, they could never be called “freely-entered into agreements”
with a straight face. Jurisprudence in this area has shown that federal
regulation usually trumps private contract,131 even though some courts
have held that claims arising under the Copyright Act132 do not preempt
contractual agreements regarding copyrighted works.133 In general,
courts will strike down contracts as a matter of public policy if they are
preempted by federal legislation.134 As Justice Roberts of the Supreme
Court of the United States put it: “[t]he general rule is that [contracts]
shall be free of governmental interference. But…contract rights are [not]
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will…exercise
his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with
the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.”135 All that needs to happen now is for Congress to act.
128
129
130
131
132

Section VI(A), supra.
Beacon Hill Civic Ass’n v. Ristorante Toscano, 662 N.E.2d 1015 (Mass. 1996).
Id. at 1017, quoting E.Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 5.1, at 345 (2d ed. 1990).
Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934).

17 U.S.C.A. § 101-810 (1976).
While ProCD held that shrinkwraps were not preempted by federal copyright law, it was
because the court found that the actions with respect to consideration and mutual assent were contract
claims in nature and not under the purview of the federal rule. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996); see Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001);
Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988).
134
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 179 (1981)(“A public policy against the enforcement of
promises or other terms may be derived by the court from legislation relevant to such a policy...”)
135
Nebbia at 510 (1934).
133

EVOLVING DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY

31

Concordantly, this leads to a more pessimistic (or realistic) view:
even if laws are passed granting end-users the opportunity to negotiate,
or sell to the service provider the ability to use the user’s personal
information for profiteering in return for separate consideration, it may
not force service providers to change. This is what is called a “business
decision.” Some service providers may choose to continue to employ
unconscionable tactics and seek to include unconscionable provisions—
they may see it as a cost of doing business. “Should we pay all of this
money upfront in modifying our agreements and separately negotiating
with end-users, or should we take the risk based on the presumption that
the end-users are too lazy to file a lawsuit and, even if they do, we will
probably settle anyway?” It is kind of like the Ford Pinto recall in the
1970s.136 “Should we recall thousands of cars now, which would be
extremely expensive (even though we know there is a design flaw which
causes an increased likelihood that the car will catch on fire if rearended), or should we ‘let it ride’ and risk the repercussions later, because
paying out for damages to burn victims is cheaper than the recall?”
While a strategy such as this in the modern era of predatory news
reporting and overabundant litigation makes this much more of a
foolhardy proposition now as compared to the climate of the 1970s,
service providers could still be more likely to risk the possibility of a
lawsuit rather than expending more initial capital to pay end-users for
their crook provisions or pay to change their methodology and contracts.
Startup costs for websites and service providers are very substantial and
investors have no way of knowing whether or not their respective web
services will succeed. There are only so many Mark Zuckerbergs in the
world with the sure-thing, billion dollar ideas.137 Wouldn’t it be better to
136
Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, Mother Jones (September/October 1977), available at
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness.
137
Winklevoss twins notwithstanding (whom the author likes to refer to as the “Winklevi”). See
Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011). An entire paper
could be written on the procedural as well as the substantive history of the Zuckerberg v. Winklevosses
“sour grapes” saga. The court summarized it thusly: “[this] litigation involved several other parties and
gave bread to many lawyers…” Id. at 1036. While the incredibly deep-pocketed Winklevi have no
problem giving bread to their attorneys, it appears that after years of lawsuits and a Hollywood
blockbuster which portrayed them rather unflatteringly (to put it mildly), their gripes (at least in the
courts) have finally come to an end: “At some point, litigation must come to an end. [For the Winklevi]
[t]hat point has now been reached.” Id. at 1042. Now they have their “Winklevision” set on bitcoins,
the controversial digital currency which affords retailers no transaction costs while maintaining
absolute anonymity for consumers using it to purchase products. See Dylan Love, Here’s why the
Winklevoss Twins LOVE Bitcoin, BUSINESS INSIDER, http://www.businessinsider.com/winklevosstwins-on-bitcoin-2013-11 (November 13, 2013).
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take get your product or service to market fast, earn your billions and the
flee outside the reach of the American courts, say Hong Kong, before the
lawsuits can even make it through the plodding American legal system?
Ask Eduardo Saverin.138
VII. CONCLUSION
It is the author’s belief that end-user license agreements are
intrinsically both procedurally and substantively unconscionable—they
are textbook examples of take-it-or-leave-it situations where more
powerful parties leverage their superior bargaining positions to force
weaker parties to accept their terms, with no real alternatives. If,
however, the reader is not persuaded by the author’s arguments, either
because of personal constitution or the subconscious desire to remain
safely huddled inside Plato’s cave,139 the author hopes that the reader
will at least concede that problems exist with current electronic
contracting. Even outside of the unconscionability doctrine and the
enforceability of unconscionable contracts, there are unanswered
questions about electronic contracting in general, including the statute of
frauds140 and the applicability of and respect for American law in the
international arena. In terms of contracting across national boundaries,
whose law should apply? What if the company has locations or separate
business entities in the same foreign nation as one of the contracting
parties? Will this lead to international forum shopping?141 Numerous
138

Eduardo Saverin, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduardo_Saverin, (last visited December 2,

2013).
139
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (G.M.A. Grube trans., C.D.C. Reeve, rev., Hackett Publishing Co. 2d
ed. 1992).
140
The statute of frauds refers to the requirement that certain contracts be memorialized in writing
and signed by both parties. All electronic contracts occur in a virtual world, with virtual signatures. In
the case of browsewraps, there is not even a virtual signature. The UCC has its own statute of frauds
provision. See U.C.C. § 2-201. The UCC requires that contracts for the sale of goods moveable at the
time of service and with a price tag of more than $500 be memorialized in a contract. The $500
threshold was increased as per the most recent amendments to $5,000 under the UCC but, as of 2013,
the new threshold has not been adopted by any state legislatures. In addition, states generally have
their own statute of frauds requirements in addition to those covered by the UCC, such as the sale or
transfer of land, and contracts that cannot be completed within one year. See Statute of frauds,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_frauds, (last visited December 2, 2013).
141
Organizations such as the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT), the United Nations Commission on Internal Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the Hague
Conference on Private International Law have participated in the emerging global debate regarding
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steps could be made to remediate the unconscionability of EULAs
domestically but, such steps would be effectively moot if they would not
be enforced in a foreign jurisdiction. Further discussion of these points
is beyond the scope of this paper—what is important is to note is that the
future of electronic contracting requires resolution of these matters, and
others. After all, the predominant point is to preserve the enforceability
of contracts and that they remain fair for both parties—a premise
currently lacking from EULAs.142

these sorts of global contract law concerns. See Jane K. Winn, Network Contracts: Managing the
Interface between Commercial Law and Technical Norms in Networked Markets, 73 Col. L. Rev. 3
(2003).
142
Now back to more important things to do on the computer, like watching a middle-aged man
serenade a litter of puppies to sleep. See The Puppy Whisperer, http://www.break.com/video/thepuppy-whisperer-1468752 (last visited December 2, 2013).

